The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters
Volume 47
Number 4 Parameters WInter 2017

Article 5

Winter 11-1-2017

Will War's Nature Change in the Seventh Military Revolution?
F. G. Hoffman

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters
Part of the Chinese Studies Commons, Defense and Security Studies Commons, Diplomatic History
Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, International Relations Commons, Military History
Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, National Security Law Commons, Other Public Affairs,
Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons,
Policy History, Theory, and Methods Commons, Political History Commons, President/Executive
Department Commons, Public Affairs Commons, Public Policy Commons, Strategic Management Policy
Commons, and the United States History Commons

Recommended Citation
F. G. Hoffman, "Will War's Nature Change in the Seventh Military Revolution?," Parameters 47, no. 4 (2017):
19-31, doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3101.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

Exploring War’s Character & Nature

Will War’s Nature Change in the
Seventh Military Revolution?
F. G. Hoffman
ABSTRACT: This article examines the potential implications of the
combinations of robotics, artificial intelligence, and deep learning
systems on the character and nature of war. The author employs
Carl von Clausewitz’s trinity concept to discuss how autonomous
weapons will impact the essential elements of war. The essay argues
war’s essence, as politically directed violence fraught with friction,
will remain its most enduring aspect, even if more intelligent
machines are involved at every level.

O

ver 25 years ago, Manuel De Landa wrote in War in the Age of
Intelligent Machines, that when we move past cruise missiles that
merely hit their intended targets to the day when “autonomous
weapons begin to select their own targets, the moment the responsibility
of establishing whether a human is friend or foe is given to the machine,
we will have crossed a threshold and a new era will have begun.”1 More
recent works also indicate the era of disruptive technologies, with the
potential to change both the nature and character of war, is swiftly
approaching.2 The combined impact of artificial intelligence (AI) and
unmanned systems might quickly evolve into the age of autonomy,
and consequently raise critical ethical and moral issues. But this article
addresses the rising awareness in the national security community about
the technologies’ prospective impact. This perspective is followed by an
examination of the scale of the potential changes caused by lethal weapons
in the context of Carl von Clausewitz’s invaluable trinitarian framework.
The major technological breakthroughs that could occur in
robotics as well as information, cognitive, and material sciences are, by
themselves, truly revolutionary.3 In the context of one construct, such
emerging opportunities and challenges reinforce a theory of five military
revolutions (see table 1). Defined as uncontrollable, unpredictable, and
unforeseeable changes in politics and society, these eras “recast society
and the state as well as military organizations. They alter the capacity
of states to create and project military power. And their effects are
additive.”4 Stopping at five historical cases, the construct alludes to the
ongoing sixth revolution, the Information Age.

1      Manuel De Landa, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 46.
2      Jeffrey L. Caton, Autonomous Weapons Systems: A Brief Survey of Development, Operational, Legal
and Ethical Issues, Letort Papers (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2015).
3      James Kadtke and Linton Wells II, Policy Challenges of Accelerating Technological Change: Security
Policy and Strategy Implications of Parallel Scientific Revolutions (Washington, DC: National Defense
University [NDU], 2014).
4      MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, eds., The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 6–7.
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Military Revolution

Implications
First Revolution

Westphalian System

Revenue generation, banking and taxes
for financing wars, and professional
militaries
Second Revolution

French Revolution

National mobilization, levy en masse, and
large-scale armies with conscription
Third Revolution

Industrial Revolution

Mass production, standardization, and
large-scale economic exploitation
Fourth Revolution

World Wars I & II

Combined arms, armored blitzkrieg,
carriers, bombers, and jets
Fifth Revolution

Nuclear Revolution
and missiles

Nuclear weapons and intercontinental
ballistic missiles

Information Revolution

Command and control, connectivity and
instant global reach, imagery, and cyber
levy en masse by violent extremists

Sixth Revolution

Seventh Revolution

Autonomous Revolution Autonomous weapons, swarms of
robotic vehicles in multiple domains,
self-organizing defensive systems,
automated weapons, big data analytics,
and machine and deep-learning programs
Table 1. Military Revolutions5
A seventh revolution, the autonomous revolution, looms ahead of
us. By combining machines and computers in ways thus far envisioned
mostly through science fiction, this era will merge the changes generated
by the Industrial Revolution and the Information Age with potentially
significant alterations in how war is conducted. Of particular salience
in this new era are developments in artificial intelligence, especially
machine learning and deep-learning AI, combined with unmanned
systems.6 These developments are the underlying breakthroughs that
5      This table expands on the information provided by Knox and Murray in Dynamics of Military
Revolution, 13.
6      Artificial Intelligence means computers executing tasks traditionally left to human cognition
and reasoning. Machine learning means computer systems improving their performance by
automatically discovering patterns in large amounts of data. Deep-learning software attempts
to replicate human brain activity. Adapted from David Schatsky, Craig Muraskin, and Ragu
Gurumurthy, “Demystifying Artificial Intelligence: What Business Leaders Need to Know about
Cognitive Technologies,” Deloitte Insights, November 4, 2014.
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make self-driving cars and operational robots possible, with greater
functionality and self-learning. Only after examining the progress in AI
being made today do functioning androids seem to be more of a reality
than like something out a science fiction movie.7

The Autonomous Revolution

Senior Pentagon leaders have already grasped the enormous potential
of applying AI to enhance decision-making, improve intelligence
production, and safeguard computer systems. A common understanding
of “autonomy” enables the discussion to proceed. “To be autonomous,”
a government advisory body notes, “a system must have the capability
to independently compose and select among different courses of action
to accomplish goals based on its knowledge and understanding of the
world, itself, and the situation.”8
Autonomous systems are not entirely new. During World War II, the
Germans employed a torpedo with an acoustic homing seeker that was
recognized as the first guided and autonomous weapon.9 Other weapons
during that war also approached some degree of independence. The US
Navy and US Army now field defensive missile systems with degrees of
autonomy built into their controls. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff identifies
this area as a critical trend:
The next two decades will see significant advances in autonomy and
machine learning, to include the emergence of robots working together in
groups and as swarms. New and powerful robotic systems will be used to
perform complex actions, make autonomous decisions, deliver lethal force,
provide [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] coverage, and speed
response times over wider areas of the globe.10

The Army forecasted the upcoming revolutionary shifts in
technology “may even challenge the very nature of warfare itself.”11
A British assessment noted “the increased capability of robots is likely
to change the face of warfare” and some countries may replace large
numbers of troops with robots by 2045.12
While the potential of AI has been hyped for more than a generation
of very halting progress, breakthroughs during the last five years alone
suggest an age of autonomy is much closer than previously anticipated.13
Yet, while legal, ethical, and moral dimensions are being debated,
  7      For a comprehensive and balanced assessment of the moral, political, and military
implications, see Paul Scharre, Army of None, Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War (New York:
W. W. Norton, 2018).
  8      Defense Science Board, Final Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Summer Study on Autonomy
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2016), 4.
  9      I thank Dr Andrew Ilachinski, AI, Robots and Swarms: Issues, Questions and Recommended Studies
(Arlington, VA: CNA, 2017), v. For additional detail, see John Campbell, Naval Weapons of World War
Two (London:, Conway Maritime Press, 1985), 264.
10      Joint Force Development, Joint Operating Environment JOE 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested
and Disordered World (Suffolk, VA: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016), 17.
11      US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The Operational Environment and the
Changing Character of Future Warfare (Fort Eustis, VA: 2017), 6.
12      Development, Concepts and Doctrine Command, Strategic Trends Programme: Global Strategic
Trends—Out to 2045, 5th ed. (Shrivenham, UK: Ministry of Defence, 2016), 67.
13      Samuel R. White, Jr., ed., Closer Than You Think: The Implications of the Third Offset Strategy for
the U.S. Army (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2017); and Larry Lewis, Insights for the Third
Offset: Addressing Challenges of Autonomy and Artificial Intelligence in Military Operations (Arlington, VA:
CNA, 2017).
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little work addresses operational concepts, organizational and tactical
reforms, or verification and validation tests for the emerging systems.
Presently, human cognition is perceived to be superior to autonomous
technologies in situations that are complex, ambiguous, and dynamic.
We know human beings are very talented at making decisions in closed
systems with repeatable data and feedback, including complex games like
chess. But our decision-making and cognitive processes can be skewed
negatively or produce irrational decisions because of bias, attribution,
optimism, framing, and anchoring influences.
The computational power of computers is accelerating, and machines
can now defeat humans in intellectual contests. Deep Blue defeated
chess master Garry Kasparov more than 20 years ago. Advancing from
a system with more than 100,000 replications of previous Go strategies
that achieved early victories, a newer AI-based version was merely
programmed with the basic rule set and developed its own strategies by
playing simulated games over three days. With unorthodox moves, the
AI crushed the human Go masters pitted against it.14 Machine learning
even composes quality musical symphonies.15
Advances in autonomous systems should continue to outsmart
humans where routine, known, “predictable tasks are being performed,
where reaction time is critical.”16 One source emphasizes, “Increased
automation or autonomy can have many advantages, including increased
safety and reliability, improved reaction time and performance, reduced
personnel burden with associated cost savings, and the ability to continue
operations in communications-degraded or -denied environments.”17
The greatest advantages of autonomy will come from eliminating the
need for mundane tasks and augmenting human decision-making,
not replacing it. This outlook suggests combinations of humans and
machines represent the future. As former Deputy Secretary of Defense
Robert O. Work concluded, “Rapid advances in artificial intelligence—
and the vastly improved autonomous systems and operations they
will enable—are pointing towards new and more novel warfighting
applications involving human-machine collaboration and combat
teaming.”18 The role of educated humans will begin to concentrate on the
higher cognitive tasks of processes such as mission analysis, operational
planning, and assessments.
Yet, our appreciation of the implications of the seventh military
revolution is weak.19 Time may not be on our side, as these technologies—
with new commercial and military applications—are already available.
The Chinese realize the inherent opportunities of these advances, and

14      Christof Koch, “How the Computer Beat the Go Master,” Scientific American, March 19, 2016.
15      Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (New York: Harper, 2017).
16      Robert O. Work and Shawn Brimley, 20YY: Preparing for War in the Robotic Age (Washington,
DC: Center for a New American Security, 2014), 24.
17       Brian Hall, “Autonomous Weapons Systems Safety,” Joint Force Quarterly 86 (3rd Quarter
2017), 87.
18      Robert O. Work, foreword to DoD Artificial Intelligence, Big Data and Cloud Taxonomy
(Washington, DC: Govini, 2017), 2.
19      See Shawn Brimley, Ben Fitzgerald, and Kelley Sayler, Game Changers: Disruptive Technology and
U.S. Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2013).
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are pursuing each of them with varying degrees of emphasis.20 The
People’s Liberation Army is also moving beyond informationalization
of warfare into smart, or intelligentization of, warfare to pursue the
same lines of effort identified by America’s science and technology
community and national security officials. This focus includes shoring
up currently disadvantaged sectors, such as anti-submarine warfare. The
Russians think AI has enormous potential, with President Vladimir
Putin claiming a state that monopolizes this dimension could dominate
the globe.21 The notion of a Sputnik moment involving AI is only a slight
bit of hype, but it does serve to alert us to the dangers of complacency.

The Nature and Character of War

The professional military community generally differentiates
between an objective nature and a subjective character of war by drawing
upon Clausewitz.22 The former describes what war is, and the latter
describes how it is actually fought. The nature captures war’s essence—
the things that differentiate war, as a type of phenomenon, from other
things. War’s nature is violent, interactive between opposing wills, and
driven by politics. War’s character, its conduct, constantly evolves under
the influence of technology, moral forces (law or ethics), culture, and
military culture, which also change across time and place.
Colin Gray captures this essence cogently: “There is a unity to
all strategic experience: nothing essential changes in the nature and
function (or purpose) in sharp contrast to the character—of strategy
and war.”23 Clausewitz observed every age has its “own kind of war, its
own limiting conditions and its own peculiar preconceptions.”24 In his
day, the major changes in conditions were social and political, but he was
aware that technological advances generate changes in war character.
Close adherents of Clausewitz remain extremely skeptical that
war’s objective nature can be modified. They insist war’s fundamental
nature cannot change. They contend war is inherently human, a clash of
wills, politically driven. Technology cannot mitigate its essence, or shed
reliable insights to remove its uncertainty. Historian Williamson Murray
is skeptical the Information Age can dissipate war’s nature, especially
battlefield uncertainty. He contends war’s nature includes the fog and
the friction of war, and that arguments contending its nature can be
altered are false.25 Murray argues, “No amount of computing power can

20      Elsa B. Kania, “Chinese Advances in Unmanned Systems and the Military Applications
of Artificial Intelligence—the PLA’s Trajectory towards Unmanned, ‘Intelligentized’ Warfare”
(testimony, Hearing on China’s Advanced Weapons, Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, February 23, 2017).
21      Associated Press, “Putin: Leader in Artificial Intelligence Will Rule World,” AP
News Archive, September 1, 2017, http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2017/Russian-President
-Vladimir-Putin-says-that-whoever-reaches-a-breakthrough-in-developing-ar tificial
-intelligence-will-come-to-dominate-the-world/id-bb5628f2a7424a10b3e38b07f4eb90d4.
22      Christopher Mewett, “Understanding War’s Enduring Nature alongside Its Changing
Character,” War on the Rocks, January 21, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/01/understanding
-wars-enduring-nature-alongside-its-changing-character/.
23      Colin Gray, Modern Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 362.
24      Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1976), 593.
25      Admiral William A. Owens, Lifting the Fog of War, with Edward Offley (New York: Farrar,
Straus, and Giroux, 2000).
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anticipate the varied moves and the implications of an enemy’s capacity
to adapt in unexpected ways.”26
A new generation has entered the debate, and these modern-day
heretics argue for capabilities in robotics, artificial intelligence, and
human-machine teaming that will change more than just the way
warfare is waged. As deputy secretary of defense, Work identified AI
and human performance enhancements as potential breakthroughs in
defense technology: “We believe we are at an inflection point at artificial
intelligence and autonomy.”27 He later told an AI conference, “I am
starting to believe very, very deeply that it is also going to change the
nature of war.”28
But what does asserting that the nature of war has changed or that
the essence of war is immutable mean? Does it mean revolutionary
changes that alter the weight, or entirely eliminate the objective elements
Clausewitz defined nearly two centuries ago, cannot occur? Or by
overemphasizing war’s unchangeable essence, are we suggesting these
aspects are completely unalterable, even in degrees? Does the standard
for changing war’s essential nature stand too high, with the elimination
of a central tendency?
Other Clausewitzian scholars contend the terminology and method
used by the Prussian theorist makes the “nature” distinction irrelevant.29
They point out that Clausewitz compared war’s objective (essential)
nature to its subjective (expressed) nature, which deals with how warfare
is conducted.30 Clausewitz did distinguish between types of elements,
but he believed each interacted and influenced the others. As Antulio J.
Echevarria II has stated, “Under Clausewitz’s concept, the objective and
subjective natures of war are closely connected to one another and interact
continuously. New weapons or methods, for example, can increase or
diminish the degree of violence or uncertainty, though probably never
eliminate them entirely.”31 Note this increase or decrease is a change
in degree. Echevarria also adds an important insight: “War’s internal
tendencies, on the other hand, can change in intensity, proportion,
and relative role as the external features themselves transform.”32 This
contrast captures how war’s nature may be altered, at least in degree and
in relation to other factors.
The early philosopher of war thought of war, and warfare, as a series
of interactions: the nature of war never existed in isolation but was always
the product of the interactions of the various elements.33 Clausewitz did
26      Williamson Murray, America and the Future of War: The Past as Prologue (Stanford, CA: Hoover
Institution Press, 2017), 34–35.
27       Robert O. Work, “Reagan Defense Forum: The Third Offset Strategy” (speech, Reagan
Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA, November 7, 2015), https://www.defense.gov/News
/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/628246/reagan-defense-forum-the-third-offset-strategy.
28      Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “War without Fear: DepSecDef Work on How AI Changes Conflict,”
Breaking Defense, May 31, 2017.
29      Antulio J. Echevarria II, Clausewitz and Contemporary War (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013), 61–83.
30      Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Globalization and the Clausewitzian Nature of War,” European
Legacy 8, no. 3 (2003): 317–32, doi:10.1080/10848770309442.
31      Antulio J. Echevarria II, Globalization and the Clausewitzian Nature of War (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, 2003), 8.
32      Echevarria, Globalization and the Clausewitzian Nature of War, 8.
33      Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2001), 237–38; and Clausewitz, On War, 605.
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not limit the reciprocal nature of war to a clash of opposing trinities, but
expressed interaction within the trinity. In short, a change in character
could impact an essential element, and could, to a degree, be changed
by it. Thus, such a change in the character and the conduct of war could
influence war’s nature.

An Analytical Framework

To explore the possible dynamics of warfare in an age of autonomy,
we can use Clausewitz’s remarkable trinity model.34 The trinity captures
the interactive elements at the core of violence: irrational forces of
“primordial violence, hatred, and enmity”; nonrational forces per “the
play of chance and probability” and the genius of the commander, which
produce friction; and purely rational forces from war’s subordination to
policy and reason.35 Clausewitz associated each of these elements with
actors or components of the state—policy, the military, and the people.
These components are the main loci of each factor, but not its only
source. Clearly, passions stir the military, and irrational factors affect
even the most deliberative policy-making process. But the true trinity
and the association with actors is secondary.36
The three essential elements interact with each other to influence
the most essential nature of war, its primordial violence. The persistence
of this framework suggests its strong analytical utility across time.37
The concept is often presented graphically as a hierarchy that implies
fixed relationships in an isosceles triangle.38 Even avowed disciples
of Clausewitz will mistakenly refer to the trinity as a triangle. This
representation is at odds with Clausewitz’s interactive and nonlinear
description of war.39 Clausewitz insisted:
These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in
their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory
that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between
them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone
it would be totally useless..40

The reciprocity between the three elements shapes the violence that
makes war so unique, and drives each case contextually. Clausewitz noted
“the conduct of any war affects its character, and its altered character feeds
back into the political ends that guide its conduct.”41 His description of
three suspended magnets represents how the three elements attract and
repel each other. This interaction, changing the nature or relationship of
the other, is central to understanding Clausewitz’s holistic theory of war.
34      Christopher Bassford and Edward J. Villacres, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity,”
Parameters 25, no. 3 (Autumn 1995): 9–19; and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, “Clausewitz’s ‘Wondrous
Trinity’ as a Coordinate System of War and Violent Conflict,” International Journal of Conflict and
Violence 3, no. 2 (2009), 204–19, doi:10.4119/UNIBI/ijcv.6.
35      Clausewitz, On War, 86; and Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, 192.
36      Hew Strachan, “A Clausewitz for Every Season,” American Interest 2, no. 6 (July 2007).
37      Christopher Bassford, “The Strange Persistence of Trinitarian Warfare,” in International
Security and War: Politics and Grand Strategy in the 21st Century, ed. Ralph Rotte and Christoph Schwarz
(Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science, 2011), 45–54.
38      Murray, America and the Future of War, 47.
39      Clausewitz, On War, 89; and Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz (London: Pimlico,
2002), 52–55.
40      Clausewitz, On War, 89.
41      Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” International
Security 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992/93): 69, doi:10.2307/2539130; and Clausewitz, On War, 87.
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The other metaphor Clausewitz employed, which is often
misunderstood, is a chameleon: “War is more than a true chameleon
that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case.”42 A cursory
reading might lead the undisciplined reader to think this metaphor is
a reference justifying the idea that war merely changes its color slightly
in response to the environment. But a more detailed reading supports
an interpretation that the phenomenon can escalate into a substantially
different form. Werner Hahlweg translated Clausewitz as this: “War is
thus not only a genuine chameleon, since it alters its nature somewhat in
each particular case.”43

The Impact on War’s Nature

The trinity offers a useful analytical framework for understanding
how the emerging age of autonomy, the seventh military revolution, can
impact the objective and subjective nature of war.
Passion/Enmity. Domestic policy leaders may find AI conducive
to targeted cyber and social media strategies that suppress or inflame
populations. This element in war is not new, but its impact is now felt
more quickly. Because of the public’s growing use of social media and
the internet as a principal source of information, these technologies
become an ideal vector for automated information attacks and influence
tactics. Additional automated methods supported by algorithms will
increase the mass, frequency, and customization of messages.44 As noted
in a recent US Army War College study, “Human perceptions and the
relative value of truth have increasingly become ripe territory for low
risk/high impact manipulation of strategic outcomes,” which gives
small actors with limited resources the promise of disproportionately
high strategic effects.45
Of course, America’s adversaries indicate they may try to do the
same. China is blatant about the potential for using AI to control its
population: “The Communist Party of China (CPC) hopes AI will have
utility in enhancing the ‘intelligentization’ of ‘social management’ and
protecting social stability.”46 Russia also has few qualms about exploiting
its population via state-controlled television and other media outlets for
the same purpose.
Extensive use of robots and unmanned systems, however, could not
only reduce public interest but more importantly weaken public support
for the armed services. The population may feel less engaged or tied to a
nation’s policy actions if robotic forces are employed. At the same time,
42      Clausewitz, On War, 89. Hew Strachan notes Clausewitz actually used “natur” and the original
text implies something more significant than the Paret and Howard translation does. See Hew
Strachan, Clausewitz’s On War: A Biography (New York: Atlantic Monthly, 2007), 194.
43      Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege Hinterlassenes Werk des Generals Carl von Clausewitz: vollständige
Ausgabe im Urtext, drei Teile in einem Band, ed. Werner Hahlweg, 19th ed. (Bonn: Dümmlers Verlag,
1980), 213 (emphasis added); Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, 69; and Antulio J.
Echevarria II, “Globalization and the Clausewitzian Nature of War,” 317–32.
44      Rand Waltzman, “The Weaponization of Information: The Need for Cognitive Security”
(testimony, Hearing on Cyber-Enabled Information Operations, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, April 27, 2017).
45      Nathan P. Freier, “Strategic Insights: Speed Kills, Enter an Age of Unbridled
Hyperconnectivity,” Strategic Studies Institute, June 9, 2017, http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/index
.cfm/articles/Speed-Kills/2017/06/09.
46      Elsa Kania, “Chinese Advances”; and Elsa B. Kania, “China’s Artificial Intelligence
Revolution,” Diplomat, July 27, 2017.
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cabinet wars that entail few core national interests are more likely to
occur since they may be perceived as politically low-risk. Such conflicts
can also be protracted because of the government’s desire to keep the
nation’s sons and daughters out of harm’s way. Overall, the impact of
these convergent technologies may impair the connection between a
population and its government while severing the relationship between
the military and the community it serves.
The populace may ultimately see the need to send humans into combat
as an indication of policy failure, further restricting the government.
The infusion of machinery, the reduction of human decision-making,
and the rise of remote standoff warfare could erode the identity of the
military as professionals with a unique social responsibility that involves
risk and danger. The corrosion of this role might undermine the ideal
of the profession of arms, accelerating the impact of the post-heroic age
on the military.47
Chance/Friction. The introduction of new information-based
technologies and robotic systems will not reduce strategic friction
or eliminate the potential for chance; however, friction from human
sources at the tactical level may be trimmed. Even if machines only clash
with other machines, unpredictable interactions with adversaries or a
nation’s own robots will ensue. Both sides, even when fully autonomous,
will contain flaws and vulnerabilities, with avenues for opponents to
inject uncertainty deliberately.
At the strategic and operational levels, AI is expected to enhance
the clarity of intelligence and reduce human biases in assessing small
changes in big databases. Some improvement in decision-making
quality can be expected. Yet, one potential impact is a higher chance for
miscalculation by decision-makers or headquarters whose information
sources or databases are compromised.
At the tactical level, contingency factors emanating from human
fatigue or fear will be reduced. That said, new sources of friction will be
introduced by mechanical failure, algorithmic degradation, and learning
and adapting in a way inconsistent with intent. Moreover, the second
order effects of the nonlinear developments of deep learning AI being
introduced at this time are entirely unknown.
Artificial intelligence and computer support are not necessary to
remove human judgment at any or all levels of warfare decisions, but
may be used simply to improve the efficacy of human judgement. Such
technology could be used to eliminate wasted human cognitive capacity
on mundane tasks. The challenge for warfighting applications involves
building learning systems that recognize when to break the algorithms
and the rule set inherent to their programing. Within this decision point
resides the human genius of warfare. Thus, decision-making in the age
of autonomy will rely upon human-machine teaming.
Since warfare is an exercise in organizational learning and adaptation,
the ability of AI to automatically update programming with the results
of each engagement or operation should be a positive influence.
The availability of this information will promote faster learning and
47      Edward N. Luttwak, “Towards Post-Heroic Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (May/June,
1995): 33–44.
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dissemination of experiences than existing human-based methods.
Thus, if learning and adaptation are positively correlated with success in
warfare, AI should help.
At the tactical level, machine learning will also support human
decision-making, and begin to displace some decision-making as deep
learning is introduced. As Work once pointed out, “learning machines
are going to give more and more commanders coup d’oeil.”48 Warfare
will become less human-centric as it becomes more automated and
autonomous. This capability can absolve commanders and their staffs
from menial tasks, enabling the application of creative strengths to more
critical tasks.
Another possible change may influence the Clausewitzian ideal for
intuition and coup d’oeil—“the quick recognition of a truth that the
mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and
reflection.”49 Clausewitz observed “this type of knowledge cannot be
forcibly produced by an apparatus of scientific formulas and mechanics;
it can only be gained through a talent for judgment, and by the application
of accurate judgment to the observation of man and matter.”50 Natural
talent and judgment in his day were gained by exposure to actual war as
well as to critical study.
In the seventh military revolution, a commander’s intuitive grasp
of the battlespace will be augmented, but rarely displaced entirely, by
intelligence and decision support systems that are AI enabled. The
natural and experientially developed coup d’oeil of the human will be
replaced—or at least augmented by—a data-infused, automated, “cyber
d’oeil” that supports human decision-making at all levels of warfare.
This evolution will not happen overnight, and there will be instances of
“artificial stupidity” along the way as AI matures.51
Those who embrace Clausewitz’s description of the role of the
commander and intuition will question the algorithms’ ability to respond
to creativity and to override the rules.52 Or, probably more important,
they will consider how AI will help senior commanders create new rules,
especially in relation to new circumstances in the evolution of warfare.53
Clausewitz argued a military commander could gain talent
“through the medium of reflection, study and thought” without
experiential learning.54 Will deep learning programs now provide
that rapid recognition, that discernment of truth, and augment deep
study and reflection? While Clausewitz emphasized many attributes—
determination, courage, and presence of mind—the one he prized the
most for a commander was combat experience. Does a deep learning
program substitute for seasoning and experience?55
48      Work, quoted in Freedberg, “War without Fear.”
49      Clausewitz, On War, 102.
50      Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Beatrice Heuser (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007), 97.
51      Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Artificial Stupidity: Learning To Trust Artificial Intelligence
(Sometimes),” Breaking Defense, July 5, 2017.
52      Clausewitz, On War, 136.
53      Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, 119.
54      Clausewitz, On War, 146.
55      Clausewitz, On War, 122.
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Reason/Political Direction. At the strategic level, politics will remain the
womb in which war develops.56 Unmanned precision strike platforms
may lessen the human and domestic political costs of going to war,
and make it easier for leaders to go to war. As Chris Coker has noted,
political leaders may “become so intoxicated by the idea of precise,
risk-free warfare that we believe what we want to believe.”57 We can
expect decision-making to be perhaps more challenged by the blurring
modes of warfare and the speed of events. Cyber and hypersonic missile
attacks will compress decision-making time lines for both strategic and
operational leaders. In such situations, the necessity for preplanned
delegation and engagement authorities is clear.
Analysts have for several decades been aware that the role of human
decision-making will be increasingly challenged by advanced automation
and artificial intelligence.58 Years ago US Marine Corps General James
E. Cartwright “predicted that ‘the decision cycle of the future is not
going to be minutes. . . . The decision cycle of the future is going to be
microseconds.”59 This sheer speed, across the critical infrastructure of
both society and the armed forces, may be the most profound change
forced by advanced forms of cyberwarfare.
The instantaneous decision-making implied in high-intensity
operations, in cyberspace, and in the employment of missiles and
unmanned vehicles moving at velocities greater than the speed of light
have led to warnings about “hyperwar.”60 This need for speed raises
important questions: does this radically accelerated decision-making
take civilians and policy out of the conflict, and thus is political direction
simply delegated to machines, is it weakened or entirely eliminated in
the process? If so, would not the nature of war be changed, or just its
conduct, because both political direction and human guidance would
be weakened?
The potential for disinformation and cyberwarfare to stress
traditional forms of strategic control is growing higher, and war may
escalate more rapidly than in the past. Suspicions about the influence of
cyberintrusion into everyday operations will breed mistrust in our most
basic command systems. This doubt could also permeate civil society
if future adversaries attack banks, air traffic control systems, hospital
records, and civilian targets. Even if directed only at government targets,
the loss of accurate information could breed instability in times of crisis.61
Clausewitz provides an “intellectual armory” of analytical weapons,
especially his wondrously useful trinity, to examine the dynamics of
war.62 Looking at the foregoing discussion, the character of warfare
will clearly change, and these changes could significantly influence the
Clausewitzian elements that frame our understanding of war’s nature.
56      Clausewitz, On War, 149.
57      Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare (London: Routledge, 2001), 150.
58      Thomas K. Adams, “Future Warfare and the Decline of Human Decisionmaking,” Parameters
41, no. 4 (Winter 2011–12): 7–19.
59      Quoted in Peter W. Singer, “Tactical Generals: Leaders, Technology, and the Perils,” Brookings
Institution, July 7, 2009.
60      John R. Allen and Amir Husain, “On Hyperwar,” Proceedings 143, no. 7 (July 2017): 30–37.
61      David C. Gompert and Martin Libicki, “Cyber Warfare and Sino-American Crisis Instability,”
Survival 4, no. 56 (Summer 2014): 7–22.
62      Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1985), 5.
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But to benefit from Clausewitz’s trinity, we should appreciate its existence
in a state of tension not equilibrium.63

Strategic

Tactical
Reason/Direction

Speed for decisions may increase to
compress cycles.
Conflict initiation increases possible
with perceived low costs.
Cyber disinformation possibilities
greater with increased opportunities.
Political subordination may degrade if
self-learning robots act independently.

Tactical defensive systems
respond in critical time
periods, displacing human
decisions to initiate warfare.
Technology possibly makes
more rational decisions with
less“human” genius.

Chance/Genius

Inherent nature retained as machines
clash and unknowingly interact
with adversaries.
Miscalculation potential increased
for decision-makers unprepared for
high-speed decision-making.

Contingency factors
emanating from human
fatigue or fear will
be reduced.

Algorithms and machine
learning will reduce the
need for humans’ tactical
Clear intelligence possible with reduced
decision-making.
human biases.
Passion/Enmity

Passions exploited by cyberbots and
social media strategies suppress or
manipulate populations.

Civic engagement may
decrease if robotic forces are
winning or losing in battle.

Media shaped by AI becomes more
potent, frequent, and diverse.

Long wars become easier
to sustain if there are fewer
human casualties.

Postheroic warfare syndrome cases rise.

Table 2. Summary of How Autonomy Impacts the Nature of War
To sum up this discussion, autonomy will change the nature of
war in several ways. First, it could weaken the role of political direction
by forcing response delegation to lower echelons for faster forms of
attack. Autonomy can lessen the ability of governments to gain the
support and legitimacy of their populations, while making it easier for
foreign governments to manipulate their adversary’s populations. More
significantly, deep-learning forms of AI will augment the intuition and
judgment of experienced commanders. At the same time, automated
63      Rob Johnson, “The Changing Character of ‘Liberal’ War” (paper, Liberal Way of War
Conference, University of Reading, Reading, Berkshire, United Kingdom, July 2012).
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technologies could reduce popular support for professional military
institutions, which paradoxically could free governments to employ
force more readily since the political consequences are reduced. As with
the earlier ages, friction and uncertainty will endure.64 Possibly, the age
of autonomy will even introduce new forms of friction while reducing
human factors in tactical contexts.

The Unchanging Elements

We should not anticipate battles devoid of human contestants, with
swarms of robots directed by their own superior intelligence. As long
as humans are responsible for directing war, for writing code, and for
fielding and maintaining machines, warfare will remain an instrument of
policy and the province of warriors. Those warriors may have machine
augmentation, delegate decisions to cyberassistants, and operate more
remotely; but they will be directing the fight. The most significant
elements of war—violence, human factors, and chance—will certainly
remain. So, too, will fog and friction.65 Despite brilliant machines, we
can count on the continuity of friction and contingency. War’s essence as
politically directed violence will remain its most enduring aspect, even if
more machines are involved at every level. Both friction and “the flash
of the kingfisher” will remain fundamental to war.66

Conclusion

While we remain at least a decade or more away from deep-learning
AI becoming a reality, we should recognize its significant impact. As this
examination suggests, the nature and character of war will be changed.
The interaction of each factor or tendency of the paradoxical trinity
will be affected in some way. Numerous implications for the conduct
of war will emerge. We will neither anticipate nor control every one of
these implications as AI matures along an expected “thorny path.”67
We should be wary of hysteria or hype about AI: predictions about this
aspect of computer development have been predicted for decades.68 But
complacency about its impact is not warranted.
In the upcoming military revolution of autonomy, we will have to
consider new sources of combat power and assess how they impact each
level of war. The biggest impacts will be at the tactical level; however,
landpower may be the least impacted of the domains of warfare given its
intimate interactions with populations and combatants. Yet, landpower
is not immune from unmanned systems and autonomy; both the
opportunity and the threat they pose will only grow. Those who are
prepared to employ autonomy smartly will be at a competitive advantage
as this age unfolds.

64      Echevarria, Globalization and the Nature of War.
65      Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, McNair Paper 68 (Washington, DC:
NDU Press, 2004), 78, 86; and T. X. Hammes, “The Future of Conflict,” in Charting a Course, Strategic
Choices for a New Administration, ed. Richard D. Hooker, Jr. (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2016), 17.
66      T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (New York: Anchor, 1991), 193.
67      M. L. Cummings, Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare, Research Paper, (London:
Chatham House, 2017).
68      Rodney Brooks, “The Seven Deadly Sins of AI Prediction,” MIT Technology Review, October
6, 2017.
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